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I Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the regulation of corporate governance
in Norway, indicating also, to a certain extent, the practice related to and
the effect of the regulation. The section following this introduction
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includes an overview of relevant acts and other sources of law. The main
emphasis is on the third section, which focuses on the internal balance
between the company organs, notably the composition of the different
organs, the independence of directors, and shareholders’ rights and
obligations. The fourth section focuses on external corporate governance,
mainly the regulation of takeovers, whereas sections five and six give a
brief overview on enforcement and recent development regarding
reporting on corporate social responsibility.
II General information on corporate governance
A Definition of corporate governance
There is no definition of corporate governance in Norway as a matter of
law. The dominant corporate governance code (The Norwegian Code of
Practice for Corporate Governance [“The Corporate Governance Code”])
does not expressly define the term either, but an indication is given of
the understanding of the concept through the issues with which the code
deals. The focus is on the relationship between the shareholders and the
board. This is confirmed through the objective of the Corporate Govern-
ance Code, which is given as promoting companies’ practice of corporate
governance that regulates the division of roles between shareholders, the
board of directors, and executive management more comprehensively
than is required by legislation.1
The central and highly respected commentary to the Norwegian Com-
panies Acts explains that corporate governance covers issues concerning
the organization of the management of the company, the guiding prin-
ciples according to which the company should be run, and the relation-
ship between the shareholders and the company’s board and the general
manager (“CEO”) of the company.2
On the website of the Oslo Stock Exchange (“Oslo Børs”), corporate
governance is described as:
Special thanks to the author of the Finnish chapter Professor Jukka Mähönen for his
valuable comments on an early draft.
1 The Central Norwegian Corporate Governance Code (Norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og
selskapsledelse), with the latest version being that of October 21, 2010. The Code is
available in an English translation at www.nues.no/filestore/Anbefaling_Eng_2010.pdf.
2 M. Aarbakke, A. Aarbakke, G. Knutsen, T. Ofstad and J. Skaare (eds.), Aksjeloven og
Allmennaksjeloven: Kommentarutgave (Commentary to the Norwegian Private Limited
Liability Companies Act and the Public Limited Liability Companies Act), (in Norwegian),
2nd edn. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2004).
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[A]ddressing the triangular interaction between a company’s shareholders,
board of directors and management. In a somewhat wider context corpor-
ate governance also embraces the relationship between a company and
parties other than shareholders such as employees, creditors, the local
community and other parties with whom the company has a relationship.3
B Sources of law and other regulations
1 Stock corporation act and other capital market acts
Norway, the land of oil and honey,4 with a narrow majority scared of
losing the country’s relatively newly found independence,5 is one of
three EFTA states in the European Economic Area (“EEA”) that enjoys
the questionable pleasure of implementing EU rules without getting to
vote over them first. In other words: Norway is not a member of the EU,
but through the EEA agreement6 Norway and two other EFTA states,
Iceland and Liechtenstein, are obligated to implement most of the
internal market regulation of the EU.7
European company law thereby forms the common framework for
Norway as it does for twenty-nine other European countries. As a result
of the implementation of company law directives, since 1996 Norway has
had two, as opposed to earlier one, types of limited liability companies.
Norway has also since 1997 had two limited liability companies acts: the
Public Limited Liability Companies Act,8 regulating limited liability com-
panies that may invite the general public to subscribe for shares when
raising new capital, and the Private Limited Liability Companies Act,9
3 See www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Listing/Corporate-governance-CG2.
4 Literally and figuratively speaking, respectively.
5 Norway released itself from a union with Sweden in 1905. In two referendums, the
Norwegian people have said no to EU membership.
6 OJ L 1 (January 3, 1994), 3 and EFTA (European Free Trade Association) States’ official
gazettes, available at www.efta.int/legal-texts/eea.aspx.
7 The EEA (European Economic Area) Agreement was implemented in Norway through
the Act of December 22, 1995 No. 80, in force from 1996. All Norwegian acts are freely
available at www.lovdata.no, but only in Norwegian. Some acts are translated into English,
and where relevant in this chapter, the availability of the English translation will be
indicated.
8 Public Limited Liability Companies Act (Lov om allmennaksjeselskaper) of June 13, 1997
No. 45. Several of the relevant acts are available in unofficial translation on the website of
Oslo Børs – see www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/Acts.
9 Private Limited Liability Companies Act (Lov om aksjeselskaper) of June 13, 1997 No. 46.
An English translation is available in print or electronically (for a fee) in the Norwegian
Institute of Public Accountants’ product “Norwegian Company Legislation”; see www.
revisorforeningen.no/a9356038/English/eBooks.
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regulating limited liability companies that may invite only a defined group
to subscribe for shares. Being registered as a public limited liability
company is a prerequisite for stock exchange listing.
Public limited liability companies in Norway are called allmennaksje-
selskap, abbreviated ASA, while private limited liability companies are
just called aksjeselskap, abbreviated AS.10 The focus of this chapter will
naturally be on the public company and the Public Limited Liability
Companies Act (“Public Companies Act”).11 Other legislation of signifi-
cance is the Norwegian Securities Trading Act12 and the Norwegian
Stock Exchange Act,13 as well as the Annual Accounting Act (hereinafter
called the Accounting Act)14 and the Auditing Act.15 All Norwegian acts
and regulations are available in Norwegian at www.lovdata.no. Unofficial
translations into English are offered, inter alia,16 by the Norwegian Stock
Exchange, Oslo Børs.17 The website of Oslo Børs offers an overview not
only of the main company and securities acts, but also the regulations
with more detailed rules (made pursuant to the acts), as well as Oslo
Børs’ circulars, decisions, and other material.18
Significant aspects of corporate governance in the Nordic region are
dealt with through binding regulation, on several levels. This is also
the case in Norway, as this chapter will illustrate. Although a number
of the provisions of the Public Companies Act allow for deviating rules in
the companies’ articles of association, in general the rules of the Public
Companies Act may be said to be mandatory and in some cases rather
10 For an easier understanding from an English language perspective, the short forms
“public company” and “private company” will instead be used.
11 While the Private Limited Liability Companies Act will be referred to as the Private
Companies Act.
12 Norwegian Securities Trading Act (Verdipapirhandelloven), Act of June 29, 2007 No. 75,
available in an English translation at www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations
/Acts.
13 Norwegian Stock Exchange Act (Børsloven), Act of June 29, 2007 No. 74, available in an
English translation at www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/Acts.
14 Annual Accounting Act (Regnskapsloven), Act of July 17, 1998 No. 56, available in an
English translation (for a fee) at www.revisorforeningen.no/a9356038/English/eBooks.
15 Auditing Act (Revisorloven), Act of February 15, 1999 No. 2.
16 The library at the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, offers a database with an overview of
translated Norwegian legislation; available at www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/english.html.
17 Beware, however, that the English translations may not necessarily be up-to-date, and the
translations are usually unofficial. See www.oslobors.no and click the UK flag to get the
English language version.
18 The link www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/ goes straight to the Rules
and Regulations page.
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rigid. Contravention of the Act is punishable by fines or imprisonment.19
However, in other aspects, the Public Companies Act may, at least from a
Nordic perspective, be seen as relatively forward-looking and liberal.
The Norwegian capital regime is under pressure, due both to recent
reforms in that area in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark and to the
explosion of Centros branches in Norway, i.e., Norwegian branches of
foreign companies, typically based in the UK, with all business activity
in Norway.20 The Ministry of Justice commissioned a report that was
handed in on January 11, 2011, with the simplification of the Private
Companies Act as the primary object of focus.21
2 Corporate governance codes
The Corporate Governance Code is issued by the Norwegian Corporate
Governance Board, which is set up by the Norwegian Shareholders
Association, the Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants, the Insti-
tutional Investor Forum, the Norwegian Financial Services Association,
the Norwegian Society of Financial Analysts, the Norwegian Association
of Private Pension Funds, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise,
Oslo Børs, and the Norwegian Mutual Fund Association.22
The Corporate Governance Code was published for the first time in
November 2006 and has been revised three times since then (in 2007,
2009, and 2010). There have, however, been no major reforms of the
Code during the last few years. The Corporate Governance Code is based
on company, accounting, stock exchange, and securities legislation, as
well as the Stock Exchange Rules, and includes provisions and guidance
that in part elaborate on existing legislation (sometimes giving stricter
19 Chapter 19 of the Public Companies Act.
20 In the Centros case (Case C-212/97 [1999] ECR I-1459), the European Court of Justice
clarified that the right of freedom of establishment within the European Economic Area
(the EU member states plus Norway, Iceland, and Luxembourg) entails the right to start
up a company in any member state with, typically, lower capital requirements, and then
run one’s business through a branch in one’s home state. Due to Norway’s requirement of
a minimum capital to start up a company with limited liability, this possibility has
become very popular, especially among small entrepreneurs.
21 The report was commissioned from the partner and lawyer Gudmund Knudsen of
the law firm BAHR, Oslo, available in Norwegian at www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok
/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2011/forenkling-og-moderinsering-av-aksjelove.html?
id=630516.
22 See more information, including which organizations inter alia the Institutional Investor
Forum represents, the Corporate Governance Code, p. 4. There are also other codes
of practice; see www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Listing/Corporate-governance-CG2
/Other-Norwegian-initiatives.
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recommendations or in other ways limiting the scope of freedom given to
companies by the legislature) and in part cover areas not addressed by
legislation. The Corporate Governance Code of 2010 addresses fifteen
major topics, with a separate section for each topic.
According to the circular No. 2/2006 of Oslo Børs, the Corporate
Governance Code will apply to companies with shares or primary capital
certificates listed on Oslo Børs.23 The Corporate Governance Code also
applies to foreign companies with a primary listing on Oslo Børs to the
extent that the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code do not
conflict with the legislation of the company’s national jurisdiction. Sub-
ject to the Stock Exchange Rules in force from January 1, 2008, foreign
companies may report according to the equivalent code applying in the
company’s home state if such a recognized code exists.
As a starting point, the Code is meant to contain non-binding
recommendations from the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board.
However, through the rules of the Oslo Børs (“OSE”) with legal basis in
section 24 of the Norwegian Stock Exchange Act and the section 1 of
the Norwegian Stock Exchange Regulation,24 the Corporate Govern-
ance Code has a mandatory effect based on a “comply-or-explain”
principle. As a part of the continuing obligations for listed companies,
the rules stipulate, with explicit reference to the Corporate Governance
Code, that a company must provide a report on the company’s corpor-
ate governance in the annual report. The report must cover every
section of the Corporate Governance Code. If the company does not
fully comply with the Corporate Governance Code, this must be
explained in the report.25 Thus, the Corporate Governance Code has
a kind of semi-official status because listed companies are bound to
report according to the Code.
Users of the Corporate Governance Code will find it relatively easy to
understand which rules are based on legislative requirements and which
are not because the Code itself sets out that it uses the term “should”
when describing its requirements (which are not mandatory, in the
strict legal sense) and the term “must” when the requirement in question
is already the subject of (mandatory) legislation. In addition, the Corporate
23 See the unofficial translation, available at www.nues.no/filestore/Circular2-2006.pdf.
24 Norwegian Stock Exchange Regulation (Børsforskriften) of January 17, 1994 No. 30.
25 Section 7 of the Continuing Obligations (Continuing obligations of stock exchange
listed companies), available at www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/The-Issuer
-Rules.
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Governance Code uses the term “must” in section 1 on corporate
governance as a consequence of the requirement imposed by Oslo Børs
for listed companies to issue a report in this respect in their annual
reports (see above).26
Among the responses to a previous consultation paper is the valid
general objection of the dominant labor union in Norway that it is
in principle a negative development if best practice codes take over the
role of legislation, especially as regards the setting of mandatory require-
ments concerning employee involvement and social responsibility.27
3 Corporate governance rules in the Accounting Act
The Norwegian Accounting Act was revised in 2010,28 setting out a
somewhat less stringent version of the Corporate Governance Code’s
“comply-or-explain” principle for listed companies.29
According to the Accounting Act, the company must report which
codes, recommendations, and regulations the company is bound by30
and possible deviations from those regulations, based on a principle of
“comply-or-explain.”31 Thus, a report on every section of the Code is
not mandatory according to the Accounting Act – solely the sections
with which the company is not in compliance. In addition to the
reporting of deviations from codes and other regulations, the Account-
ing Act sets out mandatory reporting of the composition of the board,
corporate assembly, committee of representatives, and any committee
of these bodies, as well as the main elements of the guidelines
and instructions governing the work of those organs.32 Finally, the
company must report on certain elements of the by-laws and articles
of association/incorporation.33
26 The Corporate Governance Code, p. 9.
27 See www.nues.no/filestore/HringskommentarerfraLO.PDF.
28 Regnskapsloven of July 17, 1998 No. 56.
29 The aim is compliance with the Directive 2006/46/EC amending Council Directives 78/
660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consoli-
dated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks
and other financial institutions, and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts of insurance
undertakings (OJ L 224/1, August 16, 2006).
30 On an obligatory or voluntary basis. For companies registered on the Oslo Stock
Exchange, the relevant codes will normally be the Corporate Governance Code.
31 Section 3–3, No. 3 of the Accounting Act.
32 Section 3–3, No. 6 of the Accounting Act.
33 In Norway, the equivalent to those documents is the document called “vedtekter”; see
sections 2–1 and 2–2 of the Public Companies Act.
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Those new requirements for reporting on corporate governance in the
Accounting Act and the requirements in the Corporate Governance
Code will to a very great extent be applicable to the same companies,34
and the reports will probably, for practical reasons, be combined into
one.35 By reporting in accordance with two different requirements in the
same report, difficulties may arise due to the fact that the Act and the
Code, although intended not to cover the same issues, on several points
are quite similar and partly overlapping, but nevertheless different in
their requirements. The differences and similarities in the requirements
are not obvious.36
4 Role of case law, stock exchange rules, self-regulation,
best practice, other soft law
Case law is of significance, especially as regards the interpretation of the
Public Companies Act, but the cases are few and far between. The
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet) supervises
the periodic financial reporting of issuers of tradable securities that are
listed, or have applied for a listing, on a regulated market in the EEA and
whose home state is Norway.37 The Oslo Børs monitors that companies
follow up on their “continuing obligations,” including their duty to issue
statements on corporate governance as set out above. In case of non-
compliance with these rules, including the “comply-or-explain” obliga-
tion as regards the Code, the reaction may be quite severe, ranging from
public criticism via fines to delisting of the company.38 The Ministry of
Finance has appointed a separate appeals committee to settle appeals on
resolutions made by Oslo Børs.39
34 Section 1–2 of the Accounting Act: The Accounting Act is applicable for certain com-
panies with residence in Norway, and foreign companies that are operative in Norway or
on the Norwegian continental shelf and are taxable in Norway according to Norwegian
tax legislation.
35 According to section 3–3 subsection 1 of the Accounting Act, the report on corporate
governance shall be given in the annual report or in a document referred to in the annual
report.
36 For a more detailed comparison of the two requirements, see C. Kjelland, A. Teigen, and
B. Sjåfjell, “Report from Norway: Corporate Governance and Simplification,” European
Company Law 8 (2011), 32–36 available at ssrn.com/abstract¼1714631.
37 Pursuant to section 15–1 of the Securities Trading Act, subsection 3 and section 5–4,
respectively. Detailed rules concerning this supervision are stipulated in Chapter 13, part
II of the Regulations to the Securities Trading Act.
38 For details, see the Continuing Obligations; see fn. 25 above.
39 For details, see Chapter 26 of the Stock Exchange Regulation.
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5 Reception of foreign law and style of regulation
As a member of the EEA, Norway implements corporate governance
directives and regulations in practically the same way as an EU member
state and is also bound by the treaty rules on free movement of capital
and freedom of establishment (equivalent rules are included in the EEA
Agreement). The Nordic region, of which Norway is a part, used to
cooperate closely in the area of company law. The last three decades
have seen a gradual parting of the ways among the Nordic countries as
regards – relatively speaking – the details of their regulation. Formal
cooperation is no longer a matter of course, and reforms of companies
acts are carried out in the individual countries independently of each
other. The fact that, as of today, three of the Nordic countries (Finland,
Sweden, and Denmark) are EU members while the last two (Norway
and Iceland) are non-voting half-members through the EEA agreement
has probably strengthened this tendency of disintegration of Nordic
unity. Nevertheless, we can still say that there is a Nordic style of
corporate governance, which has a stronger or weaker impact
depending on which country – or which area of corporate governance –
we are dealing with.40 The Corporate Governance Boards in the Nordic
countries aim to meet on a regular basis to exchange information
about ongoing work and developments of the respective Corporate
Governance Codes. In 2009, the Boards published a comparative report
Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries.41
C Available data and their sources
On the website of Oslo Børs, monthly and yearly updated statistics
including statistics on the equity, bond, and derivatives markets are
available. The statistics include figures from Oslo Børs, Oslo Axess, and
Oslo ABM.42 As of June 2011, there were 201 companies listed on the
Oslo Børs, 37 listed on Oslo Axess,43 332 total public companies in
40 See J. Lau Hansen, Nordic Company Law: The Regulation of Public Companies in
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Copenhagen: DJF Publishing, 2003)
on the Nordic corporate governance system, similar but yet different from the UK and
the German systems.
41 Available at www.nues.no/filestore/Rapportomnordiskcorporategovernance.pdf.
42 Available at www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics.
43 Of which thirty-five and twelve, respectively, are foreign companies; see the statistics for
June 2011 at www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics/Facts-and-figures.
norway 711
Norway, and 219,075 private companies.44 An interesting overview of
shareholders on, inter alia, the Norwegian stock exchange is provided by
the Federation of European Stock Exchanges.45
D Role of banks, private equity, hedge funds, foreign investors
As formulated in a Nordic corporate governance report, the Nordic
countries are advanced market economies with well-developed and inter-
national capital markets. With regard to their size, the Nordic countries
host a remarkable number of world-leading companies. Still, the majority
of stock-listed companies in Norway are relatively small46 from an
international perspective and with predominantly foreign (35.77 percent)
and state (35.10 percent) shareholders. Foreign ownership of shares in
listed companies has increased significantly over the last few decades.
The percentages of institutional and personal shareholders in listed
companies are small compared to other European countries: respectively,
around 7 percent and 4 percent.47 The total market capitalization of the
Nordic regulated stock market is about half that of the London Stock
Exchange Main Market.48
E Restrictions on foreign investment, state funds regulation
As a result of Norway’s obligations under the EEAAgreement, there are very
few restrictions on foreign investment. The state as shareholder is therefore
also as a general rule subject to the same regime as private investors.49
44 Information available in Norwegian from the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises
at www.brreg.no/presse/pressemeldinger/2011/07/fr-statistikk-1-ha_n.html. More limited
information is available in English at www.brreg.no/english/. Through the European Busi-
ness Register (www.ebr.org/) one can access information about business enterprises in
twenty-three European countries, including Norway.
45 Federation of European Securities Exchanges (“FESE”), Share Ownership Structure in Europe
2007 (2008), available at www.fese.be/_lib/files/Share_Ownership_Survey_2007_Final.pdf.
46 About 1 percent; see: . Bøhren, Eierne, Styret og Ledelsen: Corporate Governance i Norge
(The Owners, the Board and the Management: Corporate Governance in Norway) (in
Norwegian) (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2011).
47 As of February 28, 2011. Numbers from the Central Securities Settlement System
(Verdipapirsentralen [“VPO”]), available at vpsinfo.manamind.com/sectorstats/stock
ListsInvestorLists.do?f¼p&l¼no.
48 Danish Corporate Governance Committee, Finnish Securities Market Association, Icelandic
Committee on Corporate Governance, Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, Swedish
Corporate Governance Board, Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries (April 2009),
available at www.nues.no/filestore/Rapportomnordiskcorporategovernance.pdf.
49 More on the state’s role as shareholder, see below.
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F Corporate scandals and financial crises
The relatively few scandals in Norway have predominantly been in the
public sector. An interesting “scandal” from a corporate governance
perspective is one indicating the swinging pendulum with regard to
option schemes as incentives for management.50
Norway has so far been very fortunate not to have been heavily
affected by the financial market crisis. It is too early to draw conclusions
on the influence of this crisis on corporate governance; however, we may
be seeing indications in coming reforms of company legislation.
III Internal corporate governance
A The board and other “internal” company organs
1 One-tier/two-tier board
The Norwegian system is a part of the Nordic model, which lies between
the Anglo-Saxon one-tier and the continental European two-tier model.
The board is responsible for the overall management of the company’s
affairs, including the strategy, organization, financial structure of the
company, and oversight of risk management and internal controls,
whereas the day-to-day management falls under the authority of the
general manager; the latter is also a company organ as a matter of law.
The extensive decision-making authority assigned to the board is limited
primarily by the decision-making powers of the general meeting in
certain matters. Unlike the Finnish system, Norwegian company legisla-
tion does not expressly allow for an optional (extra) supervisory board
level, but in the largest companies there is a corporate assembly, which
perhaps could be perceived as filling a similar role (see further below).
The SE Regulation,51 therefore, with its alternative one- and two-tier
company organization, does not fit in well with the Nordic system.
However, the Norwegian legislator has dealt with this by stipulating
that SE companies with a two-tier structure are to follow the rules for
the corporate assembly (as a supervisory organ) and the board (as a
50 R. Bream, “Norsk Hydro Chairman Forced to Quit,” Financial Times (August 5, 2007),
available at www.ft.com: “The chairman of Norsk Hydro was forced to resign on Sunday
over the closure of the group’s stock option scheme, which involved a NKr210m ($36.5m)
payout to top executives.”
51 Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (Societas
Europaea, hereinafter referred to as SE), OJ L 294/1, November 10, 2007.
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management organ), while SE companies with a one-tier structure are
to follow the rules for the board. Both varieties must have a general
manager as well.52 The SE company has not been a popular choice in
Norway so far.53
The organizational aspect of Norwegian corporate governance may
be summarized as follows: the company legislation stipulates that all
companies must regularly convene a general meeting, a company organ
as a matter of law (albeit of a periodic nature) and the highest organ of
the company. Companies must also have a management, which as a
legal term encompasses the board, the general manager, and the cor-
porate assembly. Not all three are obligatory in all companies. Obliga-
tory for all companies is the board; see the Public Companies Act and
section 6–1(1) of the Private Companies Act. Public companies must
have a general manager54 – a company organ that, as a starting point,
consists of only one person. Formally, the general manager will be the
only executive director,55 although the word “executive” is often used
about the top management as a whole.56 Normally, the rest of the top
management will be appointed by the general manager if the board
has not appointed more than one general manager (which is usually not
the case).
As a starting point, the corporate assembly is obligatory for com-
panies with more than 200 employees. However, the company and a
majority of the employees, or trade unions representing two-thirds of
the employees, may agree that the company is not to have a corporate
assembly. In that case, the codetermination in the form of employee
representatives on the board of directors becomes fully mandatory;
see further below. Conversely, the articles of association may stipulate
that the company is to have a corporate assembly when not required
by law. Similarly, the articles of association in a company belonging
to a group may stipulate that the employees of the whole group
shall have voting rights and be eligible for election for the corporate
assembly.
52 Sections 9 and 10 of the Act of April 1, 2005 No. 14 (“the SE Act”). This requirement has
been abolished in Finland; see the Finnish chapter for details.
53 Per June 2011, five SEs are registered in Norway; see fn. 44 above.
54 As opposed to small private companies (with share capital below NOK 3 million), where
the board can decide that the company shall do without a general manager, section 6–2
(1) of the Private Companies Act.
55 Also in Norway, often with the title CEO.
56 See, e.g., section 12 of the Corporate Governance Code.
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2 Size and composition
a Corporate assembly The corporate assembly is to have at least
twelve members, of which two-thirds are to be elected by the general
meeting and one-third by and from among the employees. In the articles
of association, the general meeting’s right to elect members of the
corporate assembly may be assigned to others, but not to the corporate
assembly itself, the board of directors, or members of these two bodies.
The Act expressly but not exclusively sets out that the right may be
assigned to employees of the company or of a group of companies to
which the company belongs. However, more than half of the members of
the corporate assembly must be elected by the general meeting.57
b Board The board of a public limited liability company has to have
a minimum of three members;58 if the company has a corporate assem-
bly, the minimum number of directors of the board is five.59 The Act
does not indicate a maximum number of members. The directors,
or at least a majority of them (depending on whether codetermination
applies; see below), are to be elected by the general meeting as a starting
point.60 The articles of association may assign the general meeting’s
right to elect board members to others, but never to the board itself
or to a board member. This rule makes it possible for the articles of
association to assign election rights to minority shareholders or, for
example, to a major creditor (who may, in turn, have set that as a
condition for granting or renewing a loan). This basis for setting up
a company body in the articles of association is used to a certain, albeit
relatively limited degree, and the body is then usually denoted the
committee of representatives.
c Chairperson of the board The chairperson of the board is to be
elected by the corporate assembly if the company has one, and if not by
the board of directors.61
57 Sections 6–35 and 6–40 of the Public Companies Act.
58 In private limited liability companies, the number of directors may be less than three if
the company has a share capital of less than NOK 3 million, section 6–1(1) of the Private
Companies Act.
59 Section 6–1 of the Public Companies Act. This also applies for private limited liability
companies, section 6–1(3) of the Private Companies Act.
60 Depending onwhether codetermination applies; see section 6–4 of the Public Companies Act.
61 Section 6–3(3) of the Public Companies Act.
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d Employee-elected board members If the codetermination rules
apply, some board members may be elected by and from among the
employees.62 For companies that have 30 to 200 employees and lack a
corporate assembly, codetermination in this form is mandatory only if
initiated by their employees: i.e., if the employees wish to make use of the
codetermination rules, a majority of them must put forward this demand
to the company.63 If they do not, codetermination does not take place.
If it does, in companies with more than thirty employees, one of the
board members is to be elected by and from among the employees; in
companies with more than fifty employees, up to one-third of the board
members may be employees.
In companies with more than 200 employees where the employees and
the company have agreed not to have a corporate assembly, the legislator
has taken codetermination one step further: board representation, with
one employee board member more than one-third, becomes obligatory.
According to a relatively new report on employee involvement, codeter-
mination in the form of employees on the boards of companies or
corporate assemblies takes place in approximately half of all companies
with more than thirty employees (where such codetermination can be
required) and in 80 percent of companies with more than 200 employees
(where such codetermination is mandatory).64
In groups of companies, the Public Companies Act allows employee
representation at the group level instead, with the employees of the group
being regarded as employees of the company. To make use of this
possibility, the group, two-thirds of the group’s employees, or a majority
of the employees in the group must send in an application to this effect to
Bedriftsdemokratinemnda.65 This is a permanent committee consisting
of seven representatives: two members proposed by the NHO, two by the
LO, while the leader and two members are to be neutral.
e Legislation to ensure gender equality on boards The Norwegian
legislator has also taken the relatively bold move of introducing gender
62 As opposed to in Germany, external union representatives – i.e., not employed in the
company itself – may not be elected as board members.
63 Section 6–4 of the Public Companies Act.
64 I. M. Hagen, Ansatte i styret: Statusrapport 2007, (FAFO report 2008:09), available at
www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20051/20051.pdf (in Norwegian).
65 Section 6–5 of the Public Companies Act, stating that applications are to be sent to the
“King,” i.e., the government, which has delegated this competence to the Corporate
Democracy Committee (Bedriftsdemokratinemnda).
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equality on the boards of public companies, apparently done not pre-
dominantly as a gender equality initiative but as a corporate governance
initiative. This is based on the hypothesis that companies do not always
get the best qualified board members when, for reasons of path-
dependency, they restrict their selection to the male half of the popula-
tion (and just a select part thereof). The general opinion, however, is
that the reasoning behind the regulation is to increase gender equality in
the boardrooms. Although vigorously opposed, the protests against the
legislation quietened down quickly, and the legislation has inspired
proposals for similar initiatives around the world.
According to the new section 6–11a of the Public Companies Act, the
minimum number of each gender on the board depends on the total
number of directors, with the aim being that each gender will be repre-
sented with a minimum of 40 percent on the board.
Section 6–11a of the Public Companies Act applies to both directors of
the board and alternate directors, regardless of whether the directors are
elected by the shareholders in the general meeting or by the employees
according to the Norwegian codetermination rules.66 The gender repre-
sentation is calculated separately among the directors elected by the
general meeting and those chosen by the employees.67
The Register of Business Enterprises is the authority responsible for
ensuring that companies fulfill the various requirements of the Public
Companies Act, including that of the boards of companies in accordance
with section 6–11a. A company acting in breach of section 6–11a is to be
sanctioned in accordance with the ordinary rules applicable to inad-
equate compliance with legal provisions concerning the composition of
the board in public companies.68 One important type of sanction is
denial of registration in the Register of Business Enterprises, with major
consequences for the operation of the company. The most dramatic
sanction is dissolution of an existing company.69 However, an actual
dissolution is only made effective after several warnings and opportun-
ities for the company to put together a legal board. There has been a
major debate in Norway about whether dissolution is a disproportionate
66 See sections 6–3, 6–4, 6–5, and 6–37 of the Public Companies Act.
67 Although for the latter there is no gender equality requirement if one gender is totally
underrepresented at the work place (set at less than 20 percent of the employees), section
6–11a, second subsection of the Public Companies Act.
68 E.g., section 6–11 of the Public Companies Act concerning the place of residence of the
directors, and section 6–4 of the Public Companies Act concerning codetermination.
69 See section 16–15 of the Public Companies Act.
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sanction for companies not acting in accordance with section 6–11a of
the Public Companies Act. However, the preparatory works emphasize
the importance of the regulation and thus dissolution, which is a highly
effective sanction, as appropriate.70 Also, there is no opportunity to get
an exemption from the regulation regarding representatives to be chosen
by the employees, as there is for several other sections of the regulation
regarding employee representatives.71
f Duration of office As to the duration of office for board members in
general, the Public Companies Act sets out that the board members shall
serve for two years at a time. The articles of association may stipulate a
shorter or longer term,72 but not for the employee representatives, whose
duration of office is fixed in the regulation concerning employee repre-
sentation.73 The Code recommends no more than two years at a time.
g Staggered boards As to the issue of staggered boards, this may be
said to have two dimensions. First, there is the question of whether one
may have a system, for example, where half the board is elected one year
for a two-year term, the other half the second year, also for a two-year
term, so that the whole board normally is never replaced at the same
time. Second and most significantly, there is the question of whether the
articles of association can decide that this system cannot be deviated
from, i.e., that the whole board can never be dismissed at once. As
regards the first question, the Act does not expressly forbid staggered
boards (though it does seem to presume that board members are usually
elected at the same time), nor does the Corporate Governance Code
specifically address this issue. The Corporate Governance Code does
express, in its explanation to Recommendation No. 8, which, inter alia,
emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the board “can function
effectively as a collegiate body,” that recruitment of board members
“should be phased so that the entire board is not replaced at the same
time.”74 Accordingly, it may be argued that the articles of association
could set up such a system. Also, as members of the board may retire
70 For a further discussion, see H. Reiersen and B. Sjåfjell, “Report from Norway: Gender
Equality in the Board Room,” European Company Law 5 (2008) 191–195, available at
ssrn.com/paper¼1139604.
71 Given with legal basis in section 6–4(4) of the Public Companies Act.
72 Section 6–6 of the Public Companies Act.
73 Exemption canbe given by theCorporateDemocracyCommittee (Bedriftsdemokratinemnda).
74 Corporate Governance Code, p. 31.
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before the end of their term if there is a “special reason” for doing so, and
a board member may be removed by the party who elected the board
member in question (though this does not apply to employee represen-
tatives, whose position thereby is somewhat more protected),75 the effect
in practice may be that of a staggered board. However, it may be argued
from a shareholder perspective that it contravenes the spirit of both
the Act and the Code, to set up a system with a staggered board that
restricts the general meeting’s ability to dismiss the shareholder-elected
board members at will. More than that, the opposite is expressly set out
in the Public Companies Act, i.e., that a board member may be dismissed
by those who have elected the member, without any reason and with
immediate effect (not applicable, as stated above, as regards employee
representatives).76 This provision does not allow for deviating rules in the
articles of association, and is therefore mandatory. If not in contraven-
tion with the shareholders’ expressed right to dismiss members elected by
them at any time – i.e., if such a staggered board system were set up as the
norm to ensure continuity and competence transferral between old and
new board members, but nevertheless acknowledged the right of the
general meeting to dismiss all the shareholder-elected board members
at will – this should be in line with Norwegian corporate governance.
Indeed, the special protection of the positions of the employee represen-
tatives on the board makes for a de facto staggered board within each
two-year period of function for employee representatives (during this
time, the shareholder-elected board members may be dismissed but not
the employee members).
h Sub-committees of the board According to section 6–41 of the
Public Companies Act, boards of companies with securities listed on a
regulated market may, as a sub-committee to the board, establish an
audit committee.
In addition to these company organs by law, section 7 of the Corporate
Governance Code recommends that companies have a nomination com-
mittee and also encourages the companies to consider establishing a
compensation committee (section 9). The nomination committee’s duties
are to propose candidates for election to the corporate assembly and the
board of directors and to propose the fees to be paid to members of these
bodies. The Corporate Governance Code states, among other things,
75 Section 6–7 of the Public Companies Act.
76 Section 6–7(2) of the Public Companies Act.
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the importance of independence of the committee members and a
composition of the committee that safeguards the interests of the share-
holders in general. In 2011, an amendment to section 7 was added stating
that the procedures for the nomination committee should be concluded
by the general assembly.
The use of a compensation committee is grounded in the need to
secure a thorough and independent process for deciding upon remuner-
ation to leading personnel. The section should be seen in connection with
the relatively new legal obligations to present plans and statements
regarding remuneration to leading personnel.77
3 Tasks
a Board The board appoints the general manager (unless the articles
of association give this power to the corporate assembly or to the general
meeting if the company does not have a corporate assembly) and has the
overarching responsibility for the management of the company. This is
defined in the Public Companies Act as ensuring that the business
activities are “soundly organized,” drawing up “plans and budgets for
the activities of the company” and ensuring that the company’s “activ-
ities, accounts and asset management are subject to adequate control.”78
The board must therefore keep itself informed of the company’s financial
position and shall initiate such examinations as it finds necessary for the
performance of its duties.79 The Public Companies Act also stipulates
that the board must supervise the day-to-day management of the com-
pany and the company’s activities in general. This does not, however,
mean that the board members are to be involved on a daily basis. That is
the responsibility of the general manager, who at least monthly must
make a statement on the company’s activities, position, and profit/loss
development to the board.80
If there is no corporate assembly, it is for the board to adopt reso-
lutions on matters concerning investments of substantial size in com-
parison to the resources of the company, and on any rationalization
or restructuring of the operations that will result in a major change in
or the reorganization of the workforce. If the company has a corporate
77 Section 6–16a of the Public Companies Act.
78 Sections 6–2(2) and 6–12(1)–(3) of the Public Companies Act.
79 Such an examination must be initiated if required by one board member, section 6–12
(3)–(4) of the Public Companies Act.
80 Sections 6–13 and 6–15 of the Public Companies Act.
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assembly, the board is to adopt recommendations on these matters instead,
with the corporate assembly having the power to make decisions.81
In the Norwegian model, the board may in principle get involved in
any issue falling under the day-to-day management of the company, and
the general meeting of the shareholders may likewise instruct the board
on any issue. Nevertheless, there is an unwritten rule that these organs
must not use their authority to the extent that it undermines the division
of labor between the various organs of the company.
If there is no audit committee, the board also performs the tasks of that
committee; see below concerning the audit committee.
b Corporate assembly If the company has a corporate assembly, its
role is to adopt the resolutions mentioned above, based on the board’s
recommendations. The articles of association may also stipulate that the
corporate assembly’s consent is required for certain other transactions
that do not fall under day-to-day management. The corporate assembly
elects the members of the board (see above) and supervises the board’s
and the general manager’s management of the company.82 For this
purpose, the corporate assembly may require information about the
company and initiate examinations at its meetings.
Further, the corporate assembly must give its recommendation to the
general meeting concerning the board of directors’ draft financial state-
ments and recommendations as well as regarding salaries and remuner-
ation of leading personnel. In addition, the corporate assembly may
adopt recommendations from the board of directors “on any matter
whatsoever,” while other powers may not be granted to the corporate
assembly without a specific legal basis.83
c General manager The role of the general manager is to ensure the
day-to-day management of the company’s activities within the frame-
work of the guidelines and orders from the board, and to ensure the legal
compliance of the company accounts as well as the sound management
of the company’s assets. The role of the manager is delimited negatively
by the Public Companies Act’s requirement of leaving company matters
of an “extraordinary nature or of major importance” to the board. The
general manager may decide matters by a power of attorney from the
81 Section 6–37(4) of the Public Companies Act.
82 Section 6–37(1)–(2) of the Public Companies Act.
83 Section 6–37(3), (5), and (6) of the Public Companies Act.
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board in individual cases and also otherwise if the board’s decision
cannot be awaited without serious detriment to the company.84 Although
the general manager as a starting point is only one person, the Public
Companies Act provides a legal basis for the articles of association to
stipulate that the company is to have several general managers, or that
the board or the corporate assembly may decide that the company is to
have several general managers, and, in either case, whether these general
managers are to function as a collective body.85
4 Stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented approach
Under Nordic law, it is the duty of both board and management to
promote the “interests of the company.”86 As a starting point, Nordic
legislation typically stipulates that the purpose of the business of the
company is to achieve profit for the shareholders (unless otherwise
specified in the articles of association), and the Norwegian Public Com-
panies Act is no exception.87 The interpretation of the company interest
in the Nordic company law debate may seem to be moving from a
broader “Germanic” position toward a view that is influenced by the
legal-economic concept of shareholder value, similar to that seen under
UK law.88 As is expressed most clearly in the Finnish preparatory works,
while shareholder profit is regarded as the goal of the business of the
84 Section 6–14 of the Public Companies Act. In the latter case, the board must be informed
as soon as possible.
85 Sections 6–1 and 2–2(1) No. 7 of the Public Companies Act.
86 This is perhaps most clearly expressed in section 1–8 of the Finnish Companies Act.
87 Section 2–2(2) of the Public Companies Act: “If the objective of the company’s activities
is not to generate a financial return for its shareholders, the articles of association must
contain provisions on the allocation of profit and the distribution of assets upon dissol-
ution of the company.” See a discussion of what this entails in B. Sjåfjell, Towards a
Sustainable European Company Law: A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU Law,
with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2009), pp. 52–53.
88 See also L. Smith, Kampen på aksjemarkedet: en rettslig studie av selskapsovertak og
forsvarstiltak (The Stock Exchange as Battlefield: A Legal Study of Takeovers and Defense
Mechanisms) (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1988), pp. 45–61, supporting an understanding
that the trend has gone from a broader debate, where societal interests were regarded as
clearly legitimate aspects of the company interest, to a more narrow shareholder-oriented
perspective. G. Woxholth, Selskapsrett (Company Law) (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk,
2004), p. 23, suggests the opposite, by characterizing the focus on shareholder value as the
traditional outlook, while modern company law is characterized through its emphasis on
the variety of interests – “stakeholders – such as the employees, creditors, suppliers,
society in a broader perspective” (current author’s translation), which may be true in the
short term.
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company from a long-term, overall perspective, it is not to be a factor in
the making of short-term or individual decisions.89 This is also the
attitude adopted in the other Nordic countries. Several Norwegian con-
tributors to the debate emphasize that other interests, besides those of the
shareholders, must be considered;90 that neither “short term shareholder
value” nor “stakeholder value” adequately describes the perspective
adopted by Norwegian company law;91 and that, in case of conflict, the
starting point is that the shareholders’ long-term interests in profit on
their investment should be decisive. This should be seen within the
framework of not only company law, but also labor law and other public
regulation.92
5 Independent directors
As regards independence, the Public Companies Act does not set out
specific rules to that effect, except for limiting cross-membership in
company organs in the ways already set out above, and also stipulating
that the general manager cannot be elected as a chairperson of the board
of directors – and as of 2010, that the general manager cannot be elected
to the board at all. The Corporate Governance Code, on the other hand,
sets out recommendations as to the composition of the corporate assem-
bly and the board, including the independence of its members. The
Corporate Governance Code gives detailed recommendations on how
independence should be secured, including representation of a cross-
section of the shareholders in the corporate assembly, the board’s ability
89 Finnish Preparatory Work for the New Companies Act (Regeringens proposition till
Riksdagen med förslag till ny lagstiftning om aktiebolag) 109/2005 rd, 39. The similarity
between the “enlightened” shareholder value approach of the UK and the Finnish
commentary in the preparatory work is striking, indicating the recent years’ influence
of the UK approach in the Nordic countries.
90 Woxholth, Selskapsrett, p. 23. Indeed, the central textbook in Norwegian company law
clearly treats company interest as something other than the interests of the shareholders,
stating that although the general clause in section 6–28 of the Public Companies Act (see
below) shows that management is meant primarily to promote the company interest,
there may be room for other interests, including the interests of the shareholders, the
employees, or the general public; M. H. Andenæs, Aksjeselskaper og allmennaksjeselskaper
(Private Limited Liability Companies and Public Limited Liability Companies) (Oslo:
M. H. Andenæs, 2006), p. 358.
91 T. Bråthen, Selskapsrett (Company Law), 2nd edn. (Oslo: Focus Forlag, 2006), p. 51.
92 Aarbakke et al., Aksjeloven og Allmennaksjeloven: Kommentarutgave, pp. 494–495. This is
also the position in Denmark, according to J. Christensen, Kapitalselskaber: aktie- og
anpartsselskabsret (Limited Liability Companies: Public and Private Companies) (Cop-
enhagen: Thomson, 2003), p. 191.
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to attend to the common interests of all shareholders and operate inde-
pendently of any special interests, the company’s management, its major
business relations, and in part its shareholders.93
The recommendations have been made stricter in that the “majority”
of the members of the board should be independent of the company’s
management and material business contacts rather than “at least half,” as
was the wording in an earlier version of the Corporate Governance
Code.94 As is also apparent, the Corporate Governance Code, as in
several other countries, goes far in promoting full independence of the
management of the company, with the risk of undermining the advan-
tage of a board that combines the inside understanding and competence
of the management of the company with the outside perspective and
independence of the shareholder. The employee representation require-
ment may mitigate some of this effect.
However, there is also a recommendation in the Corporate Govern-
ance Code stating that at least two of the shareholder-elected board
members should be independent of the major shareholders; this is not
normally found in other codes. The motivation for the recommendation
is to ensure protection of the minority interests on the board. This
recommendation may have little effect as the major shareholders are
not normally represented on Norwegian boards at all.95
As announced in a circular from Oslo Børs dated February 8, 2011,
changes have been made to the board composition requirements
for companies’ admission as listed companies, specifically regarding
board member independence.96 At least two of the shareholder-elected
members of the board of directors must now be independent of the
company’s executive management, material business contacts, and the
company’s larger shareholders, instead of the former requirements, which
coincided with the requirements in the Corporate Governance Code. The
changes are due to the fact that many regulated marketplaces do not have
requirements regarding the composition of the board of directors.97
There seems to be a tendency among policy-makers to regard inde-
pendent board members as a mark of quality in corporate governance.
93 Section 8 of the Corporate Governance Code.
94 According to the Corporate Governance Code, the nomination committee should also be
independent of the board and of the executive management.
95 According to Bøhren, Eierne, Styret og Ledelsen, p. 110.
96 On Oslo Børs and Oslo Axess.
97 See www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/Circulars/, Circular No. 3/2011.
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There is perhaps also a tendency to overestimate the protection inde-
pendent board members can give against corporate wrongdoing.98
6 Information flow
a In the board The Public Companies Act contains a number of
provisions concerning the administrative procedures of the board that
are designed inter alia to ensure that the members of the board are given
the necessary information beforehand and that matters of importance for
the company are made the object of adequate discussion in the board
meetings.99 The Public Companies Act also makes specific rules of
procedure for the board obligatory in companies with employee
members of the board,100 with, among other things, the aim of securing
information for them.
b Within a group of companies The Public Companies Act stipulates
that the board of a subsidiary must provide the board of the parent
company with any information that is necessary for an evaluation of the
group’s position and the result of the group’s activities. Likewise, a parent
company must notify the boards of its subsidiaries of matters that may be
of importance to the group as a whole. Specifically, the parent company
must notify the subsidiary’s board of decisions that may be important to
the subsidiary before a final decision is made.101 A more detailed indica-
tion on which kind of information and to what extent information
shall be exchanged is not given and may give rise to some confusion as
to the scope of the duty.
7 Risk management and internal control
In addition to what has been said on this topic elsewhere in this chapter,
a central rule of company law needs to be included, namely concerning
98 See also J. Hill, “Corporate Scandals Across the Globe: Regulating the Role of the
Director,” in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter, and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming
Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 241 et seq.
on the idea of the independent director as the new “Holy Grail.” As Hill points out on
p. 243, there is a danger that “genuine independence may often be accompanied by
ignorance and ineffectiveness.” See also J. Lau Hansen, “Catching Up with the Crowd –
But Going Where? The New Codes on Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries,”
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 3 (2006).
99 Sections 6–19 to 6–22, as well as notably 6–15 of the Public Companies Act regulating
the general manager’s duties of information to the board.
100 Section 6–23 of the Public Companies Act.
101 Section 6–16 of the Public Companies Act.
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the requirement for a sound equity base ( forsvarlig egenkapital) and the
associated responsibilities of the board. The company must at all times
have an equity base that is sound, based on the extent of the company’s
activities and the risk they involve. If the equity base is lower than can be
deemed sound, based on the extent of the company’s activities and the
risk involved, the board must take immediate action. The same shall
apply if the company’s equity base has been reduced to less than half of
the nominal value of the share capital. Within a reasonable period of
time, the board of directors must convene a general meeting and give
it an account of the company’s financial position. If the company does
not have a sound equity base, the board of directors shall propose
measures to rectify this at the general meeting. If the board does not
find grounds for proposing measures, or if such measures cannot be
implemented, the board of directors must move that the company be
dissolved.102
The Corporate Governance Code stipulates that the board of directors
must ensure that the company has sound internal control and systems
for risk management that are appropriate in relation to the extent and
nature of the company’s activities. Internal control and the systems
should also encompass the company’s corporate values, its ethical guide-
lines, and its corporate social responsibility guidelines. The Code also
requires that the board of directors should carry out an annual review of
the company’s most important areas of exposure to risk and its internal
control arrangements. Specifically, the Corporate Governance Code rec-
ommends that the board provide an account in the annual report of the
main features of the company’s internal control and risk management
systems as they relate to the company’s financial reporting.
8 Audit committee
The Public Companies Act requires that an audit committee be elected in
companies with securities listed on a regulated market.103 The audit
committee is a preparatory and advisory committee for the board of
directors. Companies that met at least two of the following three criteria
in the past financial year are exempt from the requirement: (i) fewer
than 250 employees on average, (ii) a balance sheet total of less than
NOK 300 million at the end of the financial year, and/or (iii) a net
102 Sections 3–4 to 3–5 of the Public Companies Act.
103 Section 6–41 of the Public Companies Act.
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turnover of less than NOK 350 million. In these companies, the board of
directors performs the duties of the audit committee. When the board
performs such duties, the chair of the board may not participate in the
meeting if the chair is a leading executive of the company. The audit
committee requirement does not apply to wholly owned subsidiaries if an
audit committee has been established in the parent company that meets
the requirements for an audit committee in the subsidiary. The Public
Companies Act also states that at least one member of the committee
shall be fully independent from the “company” and also have “compe-
tence within accounting or auditing.”104 Such requisitions regarding
board members’ competence is unusual; more detailed descriptions of
the level of competence required are not provided.
The audit committee’s tasks are to (i) prepare the board of directors’
follow-up of the financial reporting process; (ii) monitor the systems
for internal control and risk management, and, if such a function has
been established, the company’s internal audit function; (iii) maintain
ongoing contact with the company’s elected auditor concerning the
audit of the annual accounts; and (iv) assess and monitor the auditor’s
independence.105
9 Duty of loyalty, business judgment rule
The board and executive management has a duty of loyalty to the
company in Norwegian law; see inter alia above regarding tasks, below
regarding regulation of conflicts of interest. Although “corporate oppor-
tunities” is not as well-developed an area of company law in Norway as it
is, for example, in the UK, Norway does, in addition to the general clause
prohibiting abuse of power and other rules regulating the conflict of
interest, have case law as far back as 1932 that shows that the manage-
ment must be obligated to allow the company to take advantage of a
“corporate opportunity.”106 Case law also indicates that there is a busi-
ness judgment rule in Norwegian law.107
104 Section 6–42 of the Public Companies Act.
105 Cf. Chapter 4 of the Audit and Auditors Act, including in particular the extent to which
services other than auditing provided by the auditor or audit company represent a threat
to the auditor’s independence.
106 Andenæs, Aksjeselskaper og allmennaksjeselskaper, with reference to the Norwegian
Supreme Court judgment; reference Rt. 1932.951.
107 Ibid., p. 655 with reference to older case law and indicating that the scope of the business
judgment rule may arguably be somewhat narrower today, as a result of a development
toward a stricter liability regime due to more specific duties for board members.
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10 Regulation of conflicts of interest
The central provisions regulating conflicts of interest for board members
are those stipulating when a board member is disqualified and the
general clause prohibiting abuse of position. First, with disqualification,
a member of the board of directors may not participate in the discussion
of or decisions about issues that are of such special importance to the
board member in question or to any person connected with said board
member that the board member must be regarded as having a major
personal or financial special interest in the matter. The same shall apply
to a general manager. Nor may a member of the board of directors or a
general manager participate in the discussion of a matter concerning a
loan or other credit to the director or the manager or on the furnishing
of security for debt.108 Second, with the general clause, the Act prohibits
the board, the general manager, and other employees who are given
power of authority to represent the company to take any action that
may confer on certain shareholders or other parties an unfair advantage
at the expense of other shareholders or the company.109 An equivalent
general clause prohibits abuse of position by the general meeting (the
general meeting cannot adopt any resolution that may give certain
shareholders or other parties an unreasonable advantage at the expense
of other shareholders or the company).110
In addition, the Public Companies Act has some sporadic rules regu-
lating or intended to regulate conflicts of interest. Concerning the general
meeting, the Public Companies Act requires that no one may, in person
or by proxy or as a proxy, participate in a vote regarding a legal action
brought against the person in question or concerning the said person’s
liability to the company, nor concerning any legal action against other
parties or concerning said parties’ liability if he or she has a material
interest in the matter that may be in conflict with that of the company.111
Concerning the ownership of shares, the Public Companies Act sets out
that the individual members of the board of directors, the auditor, the
general manager, and other executive personnel must immediately notify
the board of directors of both their own and their closely connected
108 Section 6–27 of the Public Companies Act.
109 Section 6–28(1) of the Public Companies Act.
110 Section 5–21 of the Public Companies Act. Shareholder abuse is the topic of F. Truyen,
Aksjonærenes myndighetsmisbruk (Shareholders’ Abuse of Power) (in Norwegian) (Oslo:
Cappelen akademisk forlag, 2005).
111 Section 5–4(4) of the Public Companies Act.
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persons’ sale or acquisition of shares or other securities in the company.
The notification must be entered in a separate record. The provisions
apply correspondingly to the sale and acquisition of shares or other
securities in other companies in the same group.112 See below concerning
remuneration from parties other than the company.
The Corporate Governance Code stipulates that guidelines should be
established to ensure that the board of directors is notified of a situation
where a member of the board or a member of the executive management
has a material interest in a transaction or other matter entered into by the
company or binding on the company. This is more comprehensive than
the requirements of the Public Companies Act on conflicts of interest
for members of the board and the requirements of securities legislation
on the disclosure of share purchases, etc. The company must publicly
disclose agreements of material significance for the company that are
entered into between the company and another company in the same
group.113 This also applies to agreements between the company and
close associates when the agreements by their nature or circumstances
are unusual for the company and/or the close associate in question.
The company’s financial accounts must include further information on
transactions with close associates.114
11 Remuneration, stock options, other incentives
a Board members Remuneration of the members of the board is
decided by the general meeting, but by the corporate assembly for
board members elected by this assembly.115 Information on the remu-
neration of each member of the board must be provided in the notes
to the annual accounts, as well as in any prospectus produced in respect
of an offer to subscribe for or purchase negotiable securities or for
admission to listing of negotiable securities on a regulated market in
Norway.116
112 Section 4–12 of the Public Companies Act.
113 Section 3.3 of the Continuing Obligations.
114 See Section 3–9 of the Accounting Act, equivalent to IAS 24 Disclosure of related party
transactions. See also section 5–3 of the Securities Trading Regulations.
115 Section 6–10 of the Public Companies Act. In the event of bankruptcy, the remuneration
lapses from the opening of the bankruptcy proceedings.
116 Sections 7–31b and 7–32 of the Accounting Act, section 7–13 of the Securities Trading
Regulation, equivalent to Commission Regulation (EU) No. 809/2004 Annex 1, Items 15
and 17.2.
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b Leading personnel The board’s declaration containing guidelines
for the remuneration of leading personnel is put before the (annual)
general meeting.117 According to the preparatory works, “leading per-
sonnel” is intended to include the top management (often called the
“executive management”) as well as the top manager for business units
that are not registered as separate companies. Normally, the guidelines
concern the CEO and the top management. The general meeting holds
an advisory vote on the board’s guidelines, while one particular type of
remuneration, namely the allocation of shares or any type of share option
or other scheme where the remuneration is linked to the development of
the share price, must be approved by the general meeting.118 Similarly,
the guidelines are generally not binding for the board except for these
share-based remuneration schemes, which are binding (although the
articles of association may decide otherwise: that the guidelines are
generally binding or that none of them are).119 When this regulation
came into force in 2007, the Norwegian state made it clear that it would
reject all proposals for share-based remuneration schemes in companies
where the state has voting rights, with the consequence that remuner-
ation schemes based on shares could not be entered into in those
companies beginning in 2007, and that the fixed salaries for leading
personnel in those companies rose significantly.120 The special treatment
of share option schemes may be seen as an expression of the pendulum that
is swinging: options seem to have gone from being the assumed answer to
the perceived problem.121 Several commentators have pointed out the
117 The articles of association may stipulate that the declaration be drawn up by another
body, typically a compensation committee.
118 Section 5–6(3) of the Public Companies Act with reference to section 6–16a.
119 Section 6–16a(2) of the Public Companies Act.
120 Detailed information on remuneration of leading personnel is given in the notes to the
annual accounts, according to section 7–31b of the Accounting Act.
121 With several EU member states outlawing, or considering a prohibition against, options
over the last decade, see R. Atkins and P. Jenkins, “DaimlerChrysler Drops Plan for
Performance Pay,” Financial Times (March 24, 2004), available at www.ft.com,
regarding a German court ruling “outlawing stock options for supervisory board
members”; G. Delacroix, “France to Unveil New Rules on Share Options,” Financial
Times (September 20, 2006), available at www.ft.com, regarding a proposed text for a law
according to which “directors of French companies will be banned from exercising share
options ‘whilst they remain in office’”: “The new requirement is a response to public and
media outrage over the exercise of options by executives of pan-European aerospace
group EADS and French construction and toll-roads conglomerate Vinci.” A well-
publicized Norwegian case also illustrates the controversy associated with this attempted
alignment of interests; see R. Bream, “Norsk Hydro Chairman Forced to Quit,” Financial
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dangers of incentives such as share options, as experience has shown that
there is a risk of board and management not focusing sufficiently on
the running of the company, and even going to extreme lengths such as
manipulating the company accounts in order to profit from their option
schemes, which in the end will also be detrimental for shareholders.122
When revising the Accounting Act in 2010, the prohibition of certain
types of share-based remuneration (typical share options or similar
arrangements) was considered. This was rejected, as the link between
share-based remuneration and financial misbehavior was not perceived as
sufficiently substantiated. Also, the legislator pointed out that share-based
remuneration in several cases would be justified and also appropriate.123
The Act restricts any member of the board of directors, the general
manager, or any employee of the company from receiving any remuner-
ation from parties other than the company in connection with their
performance of legal transactions for the company. The same also applies
to any remuneration that the other party to a contract or their represen-
tative has agreed on with the company. Remuneration that cannot be
received by a member of the board of directors or a general manager
cannot be received by persons connected with them either.124
The Act also contains provisions regulating the board’s administrative
procedure specifying the issues that are to be dealt with in board meet-
ings, including the remuneration of the general manager (where this is
the responsibility of the board); on the corporate assembly’s recommen-
dation to the general meeting on the board’s guidelines (see above); and
on the remuneration of the members’ corporate assembly, which is to be
fixed by the general meeting.125
c The Corporate Governance Code’s recommendations As regards
remuneration of board members, the Code sets out that this should
reflect the board’s “responsibility, expertise, time commitment and the
Times (August 5, 2007), available at www.ft.com: “The chairman of Norsk Hydro was
forced to resign on Sunday over the closure of the group’s stock option scheme, which
involved a NKr210m ($36.5m) payout to top executives.”
122 As Enron and other corporate scandals may illustrate; see Hill “Corporate Scandals
Across the Globe,” p. 266.
123 Prop. 117 L (2009–2010) and NOU 2008:16, both available at www.regjeringen.no (both
in Norwegian).
124 Section 6–17 of the Public Companies Act. Connected persons are defined in section 1–5
of the Public Companies Act.
125 Sections 6–19, 6–37(3), and 6–38(3) of the Public Companies Act.
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complexity of the company’s activities,” but that it should not be
linked to the company’s performance. The Code recommends that
board members not take on specific assignments for the company in
addition to their appointment as a member of the board. If they do
nonetheless take on such assignments, this should be disclosed to
the full board, and the remuneration for such additional duties
should be subject to approval by the board. Further, the Code recom-
mends that the annual report should provide information on all
remuneration paid to each member of the board of directors. Any
remuneration in addition to normal directors’ fees should be specific-
ally identified.126
As regards remuneration of top management, the Code mainly refers
to the requirements of the Public Companies Act, set out above, and
then goes on to say that the “guidelines should help to ensure conver-
gence of the financial interests of the executive management and the
shareholders” and that performance-related remuneration of the execu-
tive management in the form of share options, bonus programs, or the
like should be linked to value creation for shareholders or the com-
pany’s earnings performance over time. Such arrangements, including
share option arrangements, should incentivize performance and be
based on quantifiable factors over which the employee in question can
have influence.127
12 Liability
The Public Companies Act does not contain rules concerning the liability
of the company for wrongdoings by the company as such. This is
regulated by general liability rules.
What the Public Companies Act does regulate is that the company,
a shareholder, or “others” may demand that the general manager, a
board member, a member of the corporate assembly, an independent
expert, a person conducting an inquiry,128 or a shareholder compen-
sate for any damage which they, in the capacity mentioned, may have
caused the party in question by intent or through negligence.129 The
126 Sections 11 of the Corporate Governance Code.
127 Section 12 of the Corporate Governance Code.
128 The Public Companies Act contains rules allowing shareholders to petition the general
meeting to instigate an inquiry concerning the “company’s formation, management or
further specified aspects of the management or the accounts,” sections 5–25 et seq. of the
Public Companies Act.
129 Section 17(1) of the Public Companies Act.
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term “others” typically indicates creditors, but there is no limitation,
according to the preparatory works.
This provision may be seen as a codification of the ordinary negligence –
or fault-based liability for loss inflicted on the company, and since 2006,
also on others. The extension of the liability rules to damage caused to
“others,” and not just to the company, through an amendment of the
Companies Acts in 2006, was done to prevent the impression from being
given, through a superficial reading of the Companies Acts, that liability
for others was excluded.
The provision does not stipulate liability for members of representative
committees or other non-codified company organs, but can be argued
by analogy.130 Liability for auditors has been taken out of the provision,
as it is now regulated by the Auditing Act (see below).
The provision targets the individual members of company organs (and
other persons given particular roles by the Act), and not the organs as
such. For damages to be awarded, the responsible person must negli-
gently (or with intent) have undertaken an act or not performed an act in
conflict with that person’s duty in the capacity of being a board member,
etc. The preparatory works therefore tell us that the liability must be
defined based on the tasks of the various company organs (or at least the
role the particular person is given by the law), leaving it up to case law to
develop guidelines. However, because the Public Companies Act as it
stands now defines the duties of the various organs and involved persons
to a greater extent than did the Companies Act of 1976, the hypothesis
has been put forward by several commentators that the liability
according to this provision will have a larger significance than it has
had.131 The well-respected commentary to the Companies Acts states
that the liability for board members has been made stricter.132 We do,
however, not yet see this clearly reflected in relevant case law, although,
of course, this may change over the years to come. Historically, case law
shows us that where qualified negligent acts are committed, particularly
by board members, damages are awarded and there is a substantial
“business judgment rule” for board members in Norway. Even based
on a stricter interpretation, there is still considerable room for faulty
judgment and actions worthy of criticism without liability being estab-
lished. Accordingly, not every contravention of the Act or of articles of
130 Aarbakke et al., Aksjeloven og Allmennaksjeloven: Kommentarutgave, p. 653.
131 This possibility is indicated by the preparatory works as regards board members.
132 Aarbakke et al., Aksjeloven og Allmennaksjeloven: Kommentarutgave, pp. 655 et seq.
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association is grounds for establishing liability, but it will serve as a
starting point. Direct contravention of decisions by the general meeting
will easily be seen as grounds for liability, unless, of course, the decision
by the general meeting itself contravenes the law or the company’s
articles of association.133 All the members of the board will typically be
found liable if the whole board has voted for a wrongful action. Board
members voting against the majority will normally not be found liable;
nor will board members who (at least for a valid reason) did not
participate at the meeting.134
A related matter is the perception of board members of the risk of
being found liable: apparently there has been quite an increase in the use
of board liability insurance schemes as well as advance agreements
(between the board member and the company) restricting the individual
board member’s potential liability.135
The Act also stipulates that a person contributing to a wrongdoing
may be held responsible, stating that the company, a shareholder,
or “others” (see above) can also demand compensation from a party
who, by intent or through negligence, has contributed to damage.
Compensation can be claimed from the contributor even though the
person who caused the damage cannot be held liable because he or she
did not act with intent or negligence.136 This provision was introduced
into the Act in 2006 (in force from 2007), and according to the
preparatory works this is a codification of the already existing law in
the area. However, not all commentators agree, and some argue that
this contributory liability is a new introduction to the Norwegian
law in this area.137
133 The second subsection of section 6–28, whose general clause in its first subsection
prohibits abuse of power by the board (and others, see above), specifically states: “The
board of directors and the general manager must not comply with any resolution
adopted by the general meeting or by another company body if the resolution is in
contravention of Norwegian law or the company’s articles of association.”
134 Aarbakke et al., Aksjeloven og Allmennaksjeloven: Kommentarutgave, pp. 656–657.
135 These rules are the topic of H. Reiersen, Ansvarsbegrensning og ansvarsfrihet i aksjesels-
kaper (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2007).
136 Section 17(2) of the Public Companies Act.
137 Sections 17–2 to 17–6 of the Public Companies Act. The Act further regulates the
relaxation of liability, the company’s resolution to bring a claim, the possibility of
others bringing a claim on behalf of the company (typically shareholders representing
at least 10 percent of the company’s share capital), resolution on discharge of
liability, and the priority order of competing claims (the company’s claims take
precedence).
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B The shareholders
1 Fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders
As a starting point, as a matter of law, shareholders do not have duties
toward the company. It is on the board and the management that the
duty rests to take care of the interests of the company. Shareholders as
such are investors, contractual parties to the company, and not directly
involved in the company. They do, however, exercise certain control
rights through the periodic company organ of the general meeting. And,
as already indicated above, the Public Companies Act contains a general
clause prohibiting the general meeting from adopting any resolution
that may give “certain shareholders or other parties an unreasonable
advantage at the expense of other shareholders or the company.”138
Further, controlling shareholders may find themselves in danger
of being sued if they, in their capacity as a controlling shareholder,
attempt to influence the board to favor them in an unlawful way. The
contributory liability rule above is meant typically to target a share-
holder who persuades, directly or indirectly, a company organ to
commit wrongdoings.139
2 Transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit
of their controlling shareholders
The Public Companies Act has a provision codifying the principle that
distribution from the company may only take place in accordance with
its rules on dividends, reduction in capital, merger or demerger of
companies, and repayment following dissolution. The provision also
expressly states that any transfer of assets that benefits the shareholder
directly or indirectly is to be regarded as distribution.140 Together with
the rules set out above, the Act makes unlawful any transfer of assets and
profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders
(“tunneling”) or others that is not expressly allowed by the rules regulat-
ing distributions and not in contravention of the general clause prohibit-
ing abuse of power.
Unfortunately, it must be added that the law in practice does not fully
follow the law in books. Especially in non-listed companies, where the
138 Section 5–21 of the Public Companies Act, with a similar general clause for the board
and other persons representing the company; see above.
139 The Corporate Governance Code, p. 29.
140 Section 3–6 of the Public Companies Act.
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controlling shareholder may have appointed the entire board, the
chances of the controlling shareholder actually being sued for drawing
profits out of the company in contravention of the law is relatively
low. The press has brought some such cases to the notice of the general
public, but although contravention of the entire Public Companies Act
(as is also the case for the Private Companies Act) is a criminal offense,
the authorities seldom find it worth the taxpayers’ while to investigate
such cases. This illustrates the problem with not having one authority
whose purpose it is to ensure that the Companies Acts are complied with.
3 Shareholder rights and minority protection
a In general Equal treatment of shareholders is a general principle of
Nordic company law (and thereby a minority protection), though differ-
ent share classes are allowed141 (the principle then entails equal treat-
ment of each class of shareholders and across classes as far as possible).
The Securities Trading Act states that a company may not treat share-
holders differently unless there is a factual basis for such discrimination.
A principle of equal treatment is also reflected, inter alia, in the provision
on the pre-emption rights of shareholders to subscribe for shares by cash
payment. However, the Act also allows that the pre-emption rights of
existing shareholders be waived by the general meeting. Such a resolution
requires the same majority as is required for a change to the articles of
association.142
In the Nordic region, the thought of tampering with the system of
dual-class shares has provoked indignant academic response.143 In
Norway though, as opposed to the situation in Denmark and Sweden,
listed companies do not to any great degree employ different voting
levels for their shares.144 The Norwegian Code deviates from the Public
Companies Act in this respect and sets out that the company should only
141 Section 4–1(1) of the Public Companies Act; in case of different share classes, the articles
of association must specify what separates the classes of shares and the total nominal
value of the shares in each class.
142 Sections 10–4 and 10–5 of the Public Companies Act.
143 In connection with the Takeover Directive, see U. Bernitz “The Attack on the Nordic
Multiple Voting Rights Model: The Legal Limits under EU Law,” European Business Law
Review 15 (2004), 1423–1437, and R. Skog “The Takeover Directive, the ‘Breakthrough’
Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock,” 15 European Business Law
Review 15 (2004), 1439–1451.
144 NOU 2005:17 “Om overtakelsestilbud” (2005), p. 81, with an English summary, available
at www.regjeringen.no (“Takeover Report”).
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have one class of shares. The Code also sets out that trading in own
shares should be at market value and that, as a starting point, a valuation
from an independent third party should be obtained for major transac-
tions between the company and related parties. The Code also recom-
mends establishing operational guidelines to ensure notification of the
board if board members or top management have personal interest in a
transaction in which the company is involved.145
As already dealt with above, the Public Companies Act stipulates
that neither the general meeting nor the board nor the general manager
may make any decision that is intended to give an unreasonable advan-
tage to certain shareholders at the expense of other shareholders or the
company.
The shareholders’ expectation of profit from their investment in the
shares of a company is protected through the Public Companies Act’s
provision setting out that where the objective of the company’s activities
is not to generate a financial return for its shareholders, the articles
of association must contain provisions on the allocation of profit and
the distribution of assets upon dissolution of the company.146 The Public
Companies Act does not, however, give the shareholder a right to any
dividend. The general meeting may adopt a resolution on the distribution
of dividend following the submission of the board of directors’ recom-
mendation for distribution or other allocation of profit (within the limits
of the Act, designed to protect the capital of the company, indicated
above). A resolution to distribute a higher amount of dividend than that
recommended or approved by the board of directors may not be
adopted.147
In addition to the above-mentioned rules and principles, there are a
number of rules limiting the majority decision principle on specific
matters at the general meeting. Accordingly, although the general rule
is that the general meeting decides with a simple majority, a number of
decisions require various degrees of qualified majority of both shares and
votes to be valid. Examples of such decisions are amendments of the
articles of association, share capital alterations, and mergers or demergers.
145 Section 4 of the Corporate Governance Code.
146 Section 2–2(2) of the Public Companies Act, touched upon earlier in this chapter.
147 If the company has a corporate assembly, the articles of association may stipulate that a
resolution on the distribution of dividend shall be adopted by the corporate assembly
subject to the general meeting’s approval of the annual accounts and the director’s
report; section 8–2 of the Public Companies Act.
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There are also rules granting a certain minority the right to force certain
decisions, such as to summon a general meeting and to request an
investigation of the company’s management.148
Additional minority shareholder protection is obtained by the rela-
tively far-reaching rights of the individual shareholder. Most of the
rights given to shareholders in the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive
(2007/36/EC) were part of the Nordic companies acts, including
the Norwegian, long before the Directive. Each shareholder, irrespect-
ive of the number or class of shares held, has the right to participate
in the general meeting and to vote on his or her shares. Shareholders
who are not able to attend in person may exercise their rights by
proxy. Each shareholder has the right to table resolutions and to
ask questions on topics within the scope of the agenda of the general
meeting.
b Implementation of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive The Share-
holders’ Rights Directive was implemented in Norway in 2009,149
applying some of the rules from the Directive not only to sharehold-
ers in listed companies (to which the Directive applies), but to
shareholders in all public companies, listed or not. Some rules only
define more precisely already applicable law.150 Certain new arrange-
ments that are voluntary for companies were also introduced for all
public companies, such as participating at the general meeting
through electronic means and advance voting. Some of the rules of
the Directive are, however, only implemented with effect for listed
companies, inter alia, the requirement that companies must have a
website where certain, specified company information is available
for the shareholders.
For public companies, the changes include a specification that the
articles of association may stipulate that the right to participate in and
vote at the general meeting is contingent on the purchase of the shares
being registered in the shareholder register five working days before the
general meeting. The Corporate Governance Code recommends that no
limit of a certain number of days be set, and that all shareholders who
148 Sections 5–7(2) and 5–25 to 5–27 of the Public Companies Act.
149 Act of June 19, 2009 No. 77, amending the Private Companies Act and the Public
Companies Act, in force from August 3, 2009 (with some additional amendments
adopted in 2010).
150 Also implemented for private companies.
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can document their shareholding are allowed to participate and vote at
the meeting.151 Further, the Public Companies Act now specifies that
articles of association may not set other limits for the transfer of shares
in this period (between registering and general meeting) than are
applicable otherwise.152 The Public Companies Act now specifically
allows electronic participation at general meetings. The conditions that
the board must ensure are fulfilled are that the general meeting can be
held in a sound manner and that there are systems in place to ensure
that the Public Companies Act’s requirements for general meetings
are met.153 The systems must ensure that participation and voting can
be checked in a satisfactory manner, and there must be a secure way of
authenticating the sender. The articles of association may set out more
specific requirements for electronic participation at general meet-
ings.154 The Act now also specifies that voting may be done in advance,
also electronically, with the same requirements as to security and
authorization.155
The Act specifies that the company cannot require payment for send-
ing out the notice for the general meeting, and that the agenda must
specify properly the business to be dealt with at the meeting. Further, in
companies with electronic participation, the notice must provide infor-
mation about this and specify the procedure. Where information is
available on the website of the company, the notice must include infor-
mation about this and how the shareholders can request the documents
to be sent to them instead. If a precondition of participation and voting is
registering of the share purchase at a certain date in advance, this must
also be included in the notice.156
A further change to the Public Companies Act is to specify the time
in advance that a shareholder must notify the board of the company
if that shareholder wishes to have an issue discussed at the general
meeting. This is now set to seven days before the deadline to send out
the notice to convene the general meeting. If the notice has already been
sent, a new notice is to be sent out if the deadline for convening the
151 Section 4–2(3) of the Public Companies Act.
152 Section 4–15(5) of the Public Companies Act.
153 As of January 2011, systems for electronic voting at the general assembly were not in
place (personal information given to the co-author from DnBNOR Securities Services).
154 Section 5–8a of the Public Companies Act.
155 Section 5–8b of the Public Companies Act.
156 Section 5–10 of the Public Companies Act.
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meeting has not passed. Further, the Act now specifies that a share-
holder may put forward a proposal to be voted on.157
If the company uses the option to post its documents on the com-
pany’s website, individual shareholders may nevertheless request that the
documents be sent to them, and the company may not require payment
for this service.158
For listed companies, the Public Companies Act now specifies that a
notice convening a general meeting must be sent out twenty-one days
beforehand, unless the articles of association set a longer deadline. If
electronic participation is possible, the deadline may be set to two weeks.
Detailed requirements are set out in a regulation implementing the
Shareholders’ Rights Directive, including details concerning information
and forms concerning the general meeting that are to be available on the
website of the company.
The Corporate Governance Code had a very detailed recommendation
concerning general meetings, most of which now is covered by the
implementation of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive.
Regarding information, see also above on information from the board
and within a group. The Corporate Governance Code stipulates in its
Recommendation No. 13 that the board should establish guidelines for
the reporting of financial and other information based on openness and
equal treatment, publishing of the financial calendar, and equal publish-
ing on the web and information distributed by post. Also, the board
should establish guidelines for the company’s contact with shareholders
other than through general meetings.
That shares are freely transferable is often also perceived as a share-
holder right and perhaps particularly a minority protection issue
(though this may be just as relevant for a majority blockholder). The
Corporate Governance Code sets out in its Recommendation No. 5
that shares in listed companies must, in principle, be freely negotiable,
and therefore “no form of restriction on negotiability should be
included in a company’s articles of association.” As one may deduce
from the wording, it is permissible according to the Public Companies
157 Section 5–11 of the Public Companies Act. The preparatory works do, however,
assume that this right cannot be understood as a right to demand that a certain issue
be voted on in a certain manner – it is a right to require that the matter be discussed,
and it is then up to the general meeting to decide how this will be voted over (and in
which order, etc.).
158 Section 5–11a of the Public Companies Act.
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Act to restrict the transferability of shares.159 The basic requirement
imposed by the stock exchange legislation and regulations is that a
listed company may only exercise any provisions in its articles of
association for transfers of shares to require approval by the board
of directors, restrictions on share ownership, or other restrictions on
the negotiability of shares to the extent that there is sufficient cause to
restrict negotiability and that such restriction will not cause disturb-
ances in the market.
4 Institutional investors
In a detailed study of Norwegian shareholders from 2001, the authors
found that what they termed “financial investors” – what we usually call
institutional investors, i.e., private Norwegian banks, insurance firms,
pension funds, and investment trusts (mutual funds) – represented a
small but growing number of shareholders, increasing from an average of
approximately 13 percent in 1989 to 21 percent in 1997. The average
number of financial investors per firm more than doubled over the
sample period, and the total number of equity positions held by finan-
cials more than quadrupled over the nine years, which was the basis for
the study.160 However, the percentage of financial investors in Norway
has decreased since 1999, and is now at 7 percent.161
The Institutional Investor Forum is one of the issuers of the Corporate
Governance Code.
5 State ownership
The Norwegian state holds a direct ownership of about 30 percent of the
shares of Norwegian public companies.162 The percentage of state share-
holdings increased around the beginning of the new millennium, mainly
due to privatization of several companies. Since 2003, the percentage has
decreased from around 44 percent in 2002. Maintaining a relatively high
state shareholding is substantiated by the desire to ensure solid industrial
growth and achieve returns and revenues for the common good. Com-
panies controlled by the state shall be ensured of professional and
159 Sections 4–15 to 4–23 of the Public Companies Act.
160 The data set includes every owner of every listed Norwegian firm over the period 1989–
1997, . Bøhren and B. degaard, Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a
Unique Data Set (Research paper from BI School of Management, 2001), available at
finance.bi.no/~bernt/papers/eierstru_descriptive/bohren-odegaard-2001-nopec-patterns-of
-corporate-ownership.pdf.
161 FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe 2007. 162 Ibid.
norway 741
active ownership and a predictable dividend policy. The state as control-
ling shareholder has the capabilities required for this. It can be a long-
term and stable shareholder.163
There is an ongoing public debate as to whether and to what extent
the state should maintain its extensive ownership of shares and thereby
the control of a wide range of companies. Questions include the
following: How should the state act as a shareholder? May the state
use its power to promote overarching societal objectives such as envir-
onmental protection and mitigating climate change?164
6 Shareholder activism
“Shareholder activism” covers two different but to a certain extent
interlinked topics, namely the activism of shareholders to protect their
own investment (the core of the corporate governance debate as it
is often understood) and the role of active shareholders taking upon
themselves a wider societal role (the activism that is typically discussed
under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility). Norway has
a number of companies with controlling shareholders that exhibit
activism in the narrow realm of corporate governance and also, to a
certain extent, in the wider form, where other societal interests
are sought to be protected. Traditionally, at least a certain number
of the large Norwegian investors have seen themselves as entrepre-
neurs, value-builders, the creators of work places, and in some cases
even the creators of entire societies. Today we see to a greater degree
the influence of the Anglo-American, law-and-economics-inspired,
shareholder primacy drive, as the Corporate Governance Code may
illustrate.
163 Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, “The State’s Ownership Report 2006”
(2006), available at www.eierberetningen.no/2009/asset/ownership_report_2006.pdf.
164 This has also been discussed internationally in connection with Statoil’s tar sand project
in Canada, where influential institutional investors and NGOs have petitioned the state
to use its position as controlling shareholder to ensure that Statoil withdraws from the
tar sand project. The state has so far been reticent in employing shareholder activism to
achieve societal goals, preferring to have a more laid-back position, despite its declared
intention to be an active shareholder; see, e.g., the press release of April 4, 2011, available
at www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nhd/selected-topics/ownership.html?id=1336. The state’s
possible duty, and the competence of the state as a shareholder to promote environ-
mental protection, is discussed in depth in a paper by A. By Teigen, presented at the
conference “Towards Sustainable Companies: Identifying New Avenues,” University of
Oslo, August 29–30, 2011 (for more information, see www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/
research/projects/sustainable-companies/).
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C Labor
1 Codetermination on the board or only
plant codetermination
The election of board members by and among employees as well as
by the corporate assembly has been outlined above. It should also be
mentioned that employee involvement in Norway is based on a com-
plexity of rules and systems ranging from the collective-agreement-based
systems through to company law and labor law, which today is a mix of
traditional Norwegian law and law based on implementation of EU rules.
2 Strong or not-so-strong trade unions
Traditionally, trade unions have had quite a strong position in Norway,
though probably not as strong as that of the German trade unions.165
D Audit: mandatory auditing by external auditors
External auditing is regulated in the Public Companies Act, Chapter 7.
Further details are set out in the separate Auditing Act from 1999.
All limited liability companies, both public and private, are obligated
to have an auditor. The general meeting elects the auditor,166 based on
the proposal of the corporate assembly, with the comments of the
auditing committee if there is one. This competence cannot be delegated
to the board or to any other company organ.
The general meeting also has approval rights of the remuneration of
the auditor. The auditor cannot be dismissed during the period of service
without valid reason.
The elected auditor must serve until another auditor has been elected.
The auditor must attend the general meeting if the business to be trans-
acted is of such a nature that his or her attendance is regarded as necessary.
The auditor is, in any case, entitled to participate in the general meeting.
The Auditing Act, Chapter 4, sets out requirements for the independ-
ence and objectivity of the auditor. Auditors are required to identify any
errors or shortcomings in respect of the company’s accounting and the
management of its assets by means of an itemized letter addressed to the
company’s management (in the case of a public limited company,
this will normally be the board of directors).
165 For literature references, in English, please contact the lead author.
166 Section 7–1 of the Public Companies Act.
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The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway has issued guidelines
for auditors’ provision of advisory services to audit clients.167
The remuneration paid to the auditor must be approved by the general
meeting. The notes to the annual accounts provide information on the
remuneration paid to the auditor and a breakdown of this remuneration
between the audit fee and fees for other services.
The auditor may be held liable “for any damages to which he has given
rise, willfully or through negligence, in the performance of his assign-
ment.”168 There is case law concerning auditors’ liability.
The Corporate Governance Code’s Recommendation No. 15 deals
with the contact between the auditor and the board, etc.
IV External corporate governance
A Takeover regulation
The lead author of this chapter has previously written two reports
concerning the implementation of the Takeover Directive169 into
Norwegian law. These reports give an overview of the takeover rules in
Norway, highlighting the then main proposed changes due to the imple-
mentation of the Takeover Directive – and, in the second report, discuss-
ing especially the “acting in concert” condition in the mandatory bid rule.
Generally speaking, the proposed changes to Norwegian legislation
were adopted without any controversy, as Norwegian law already was
in line with the main principles of the Directive. With visions of an even
more competitive and liquid capital market, the Norwegian Takeover
Committee170 had endeavored to bring the Norwegian rules in line with
those of its closest European neighbors, and beyond the demands of
the Takeover Directive. However, this did not extend to opting in to the
breakthrough rules – but then neither have the majority of the EU
member states. For reasons of time and space, reference is made to these
reports for background and details.171
167 Available at www.finanstilsynet.no/en/Auditing/Regulation/Circulars/.
168 Chapter 8 of the Auditing Act, quote from section 8–1 of the Auditing Act.
169 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 21, 2004
on takeover bids OJ L142/13, April 30, 2004 (“Takeover Directive”).
170 The Committee on Markets in Financial Instruments (Verdipapirmarkedslovutvalget)
presented its report with a proposal for draft legislation to implement the Takeover
Directive in Norwegian law on August 25, 2005, pp. 9–11.
171 B. Sjåfjell, “Report from Norway: The New Takeover Regime,” European Company
Law 3(1) (2006), 35–39 and B. Sjåfjell, “Country Report from Norway: The New
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There is no Takeover Code as such in Norway, but the Corporate
Governance Code referred to in this chapter sets out in its Recommen-
dation No. 14 regarding takeovers that the board should establish guiding
principles for how it will act in the event of a takeover bid. As in the
Takeover Directive, the board’s responsibility for equal treatment of
shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary disruption of the com-
pany’s business activities is emphasized. Unlike the Takeover Directive,
the Corporate Governance Code also emphasizes that this is the respon-
sibility of the management, in addition to the board. The Corporate
Governance Code seemingly has a more nuanced non-obstruction rule
for the board: the board should not “seek to hinder or obstruct take-over
bids for the company’s activities or shares unless there are particular
reasons for this.”172 However, as with the Takeover Directive, the Cor-
porate Governance Code recommends that the board not take any action
(“exercise mandates or pass any resolutions”) to obstruct the takeover bid
unless this is approved by the general meeting after the bid has been
announced.173 The Corporate Governance Code emphasizes the board’s
duty to issue a statement with its view on the bid, clarifying that this
should include a recommendation to the shareholder to sell or not to sell.
This is in line with the Takeover Directive, and one of the rules that had
to be made more explicit in Norwegian law to comply with the Directive.
As does the UK Takeover Code (but not the Directive), the Norwegian
Corporate Governance Code recommends that the board should arrange
a valuation from an independent expert.
Chapter 6 of the Securities Trading Act sets out the rules for manda-
tory and voluntary offers. Any party that through acquisition becomes
the owner of shares representing more than one-third of the voting rights
in a Norwegian company whose shares are quoted on a Norwegian
regulated market is required to either make an offer to purchase the
remaining shares in the company (duty to make a mandatory offer), or to
reduce its shareholding to below this threshold. This also applies when
Takeover Regime (2),” European Company Law 3(3) (2006), 202–206, both freely
available at ssrn.com/author¼375947.
172 Emphasis added.
173 This is reiterated in the Corporate Governance Code’s recommendation as concerns
transactions that in effect are “disposal of the company’s activities,” with the caveat that
such a decision may have to be made by the corporate assembly and not the general
meeting in accordance with section 6–37(4) of the Public Companies Act, which, inter
alia, leaves decisions that will greatly impact employees to the exclusive competence of
the corporate assembly.
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the number of voting rights held passes 40 percent and 50 percent
(repeated duty to make a mandatory offer). Such a party must immedi-
ately notify the stock exchange and the company when it enters into an
agreement to acquire shares that will trigger the duty to make a manda-
tory offer. The offer price must be at least as high as the highest price the
party making the offer has paid or agreed during the last six months prior
to the duty to make a mandatory offer being triggered. The offer must
also be unconditional, with settlement in cash, and the period for accept-
ance must be between four and six weeks. A voluntary offer becomes
subject to statutory regulation if the offer will cause the threshold for a
mandatory offer to be exceeded if the offer is accepted by the parties to
whom it is available.
In the case of both mandatory and voluntary offers, there are statutory
requirements on the equal treatment of shareholders and on the infor-
mation to be provided in the offer document. The general clauses and the
general principle of equal treatment set out above apply.174
As regards squeeze-out and sell-out rules, the Norwegian rules are
applicable not only in the context of takeover bids but generally.175
B Disclosure and transparency
As in the other European countries within the EEA, the accounting rules
are based on the EU Accounting Directives. The Norwegian Accounting
Act has been amended recently to implement the latest changes concern-
ing international accounting standards.176
As explained in the Corporate Governance Code, the board of direct-
ors’ guidelines for reporting financial and other information to the
securities market must be defined within the framework established by
securities and accounting legislation and the rules and regulations of the
stock exchange. The company’s ability to provide information to indi-
vidual participants, including investment analysts, will be restricted both
by the regulatory framework, including the rules on good stock exchange
practice, and by the general requirements for equal treatment.
174 See the Corporate Governance Code itself for a more extensive overview of the prevail-
ing legislation, and the relationship between these rules and the recommendations of the
Corporate Governance Code.
175 Takeover Report, pp. 61–65; see the general rules in sections 4–24 to 4–25 of the Public
Companies Act.
176 Accounting Act of July 17, 1998 No. 7, as mentioned above, available in an updated and
translated English version at www.revisorforeningen.no (for a fee).
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Persons who are privy to inside information must not pass such infor-
mation to unauthorized parties.177 Further provisions are included in
Chapter 3 of the Securities Trading Act on the management of such inside
information. The company must manage the information it releases within
the framework imposed by the Securities Trading Act, including section
5–14, and by the general principle of equal treatment.178
For further information on disclosure requirements for listed com-
panies, see the information given in section II above, concerning the rules
of the Oslo Børs.
V Enforcement
A Available sanctions and their relevance
As touched upon earlier in this chapter, although contravention of any
provision in both Companies Acts is a criminal offense, the police seldom
prioritize investigating such cases, if they are brought to the police’s
notice at all. As pointed out, this illustrates the problem with not having
one authority whose purpose it is to ensure that the Companies Acts are
complied with. Usually, cases are only brought before the courts if there
is a minority shareholder with a claim against the company, board
members, or a controlling shareholder, or if the company goes bankrupt
and there are enough funds to investigate (which is usually not the case).
B Shareholders
Norwegian law recognizes derivative suits, as briefly dealt with above.
The Public Companies Act also recognizes the right to demand inquiries
into the management of the company. A shareholder may submit a
motion on an inquiry into the company’s formation, management, or
further specified aspects of the management or the accounts. The motion
may be submitted at an ordinary general meeting or at a general meeting
for which the notice convening it states that such an inquiry is to be
discussed. If the motion is endorsed by shareholders owning at least 10
percent of the share capital represented at the general meeting, each
shareholder may file a petition within one month after the general
meeting that the district court order an inquiry.179
177 Section 3–4 of the Securities Trading Act.
178 See, inter alia, section 4–1 of the Public Companies Act.
179 Sections 5–25 to 5–27 of the Public Companies Act.
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C Others
The press is relatively active. The stock exchange resolutions are followed
closely. Worth mentioning is also that according to the General Civil
Penal Code,180 a company may be liable to penalty itself when a penal
provision is contravened by a person who is acting on behalf of a
company. This applies even if no individual person may be punished
for the contravention. The penalty will be in the form of a fine and/or
restriction of permissions.
VI Reporting of corporate social responsibility
In a consultation paper from October 2010 from the Ministry of
Finance,181 new requirements in the Accounting Act regarding corporate
social responsibility are proposed. According to the proposal, larger
companies shall report annually on their social responsibility in the
report of the board of directors or in another document that is referred
to in the report of the board. Exceptions are proposed for companies that
report according to the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting
Initiative (“GRI”), or similar foreign regulations.
The Accounting Act requires companies to report on working envir-
onment, gender equality, anti-discrimination, and protection of the
environment.182
As a response to the increased focus on corporate social responsibility,
the Norwegian Corporate Governance Code stipulates that companies
should enjoy good relationships with society as a whole, and particularly
with the stakeholder groups that are affected by their business
180 Section 27 of the General Civil Penal Code (Straffeloven) of May 20, 2005 No. 28.
181 Ministry of Finance, “Rapportering av selskapers samfunnsansvar” (Reporting on Cor-
porate Social Responsibility) (Letter of consultation from the Ministry), (in Norwegian)
(October 26, 2010), regarding the report “Rapportering av selskapers samfunnsansvar”
(Reporting on Corporate Social Responsibility), available at www.regjeringen.no
(in Norwegian only).
182 Section 3–3a of the Accounting Act. The environmental reporting requirement is
discussed in depth in a forthcoming paper by Miriam Aakre Borgersrud, to be presented
at the conference “Towards Sustainable Companies: Identifying New Avenues,”
University of Oslo, August 29–30, 2011 (for more information: www.jus.uio.no/ifp
/english/research/projects/sustainable-companies/). See also a brief discussion of the
reporting requirements, as well as the new proposal, in B. Sjåfjell, “Why Law
Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility and the Futility of Voluntary Climate Change
Mitigation,” European Company Law 8 (2011), 56–64, available at ssrn.com
/abstract¼1774759.
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activities.183 In 2010, the Corporate Governance Code was amended with
the recommendation to the boards to define the company’s basic corpor-
ate values and formulate ethical as well as corporate social responsibility
guidelines. The Corporate Governance Code also refers to the corporate
social responsibility guidelines in its section on internal control and
systems for risk management.184
Due to the increased corporate governance and social responsibility
requirements,185 there is a corresponding increase in the number of
different requirements on which public companies have to report. It
should be considered whether a concentration of the requirements for
reporting on the same fields could lead to a better quality of reporting.
Also, the companies’ costs and use of resources expended on reporting
would probably be lower.
VII Summary, final conclusions, and observations
Norwegian corporate governance is in many ways international and
modern in its outlook, and naturally very EU-influenced because of
the EEA agreement – though we can still say that we have a particular
Nordic model.
However, some of the Norwegian rules are outdated and inflexible,
and it may well be argued that some of the specific and in part overlap-
ping mandatory rules in our Companies Acts should be removed, or at
least revised.186 A more active and independent approach to implemen-
tation of EU rules would be helpful. This is not the opposite of a loyal
approach; instead, it is an approach where, for example, the Directive
rules to be implemented are considered in their broader context, and –
where warranted – the opportunity is used to revise Norwegian law. As
has been pointed out in one of the reports on the implementation of the
Takeover Directive (referred to above), the Norwegian Takeover Com-
mittee’s somewhat reticent and defensive attitude in its implementation
183 Corporate Governance Code, p. 6.
184 Section 10 of the Corporate Governance Code.
185 See section II above regarding requirements for reporting of corporate governance in the
Accounting Act and in the Corporate Governance Code.
186 See B. Sjåfjell, “Kun til plunder og heft? – Forbudet mot selskapsfinansiering av aksjeer-
verv i den norske allmennaksjeloven § 8–10” (Obstructive and Obsolete? The Prohib-
ition against Financial Assistance for the Acquisition of Shares in the Public Limited
Liability Companies Act Sect. 8–10), Nordisk Tidsskrift for Selskabsret (Nordic Journal of
Company Law) 1(2) (2009), 116–145.
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proposal gives grounds for questioning the very purpose underlying the
implementation of the Directive. Was this meant to be Norway’s contri-
bution to harmonizing company and securities law in Europe with the
assumed benefits of more cross-border trade? Or is the point for the
Norwegian legislature merely to avoid direct and clear conflict with
the Directive, leaving unclear issues to be resolved by the affected parties
through practice and litigation?
A full revision of our company legislation is called for, and a more
principle-based approach (as far as EU law allows) may well be war-
ranted. This should, however, be considered in a broader context. In such
a revision, the issues of the company interest and the role of the board
should have a central position – both as they are understood today and
as they should be regulated in the future.187 To be able to have a well-
founded opinion on these issues, we need a fundamental and nuanced
debate on where we are going: on the role of the company, and thereby
the role of company law and corporate governance in general, in our
globalized economy.188
VIII Annex
A Cases
Some relatively new cases related to the Stock Exchange Rules:
1 Court cases
DNO International ASA (Oslo City Court, October 21, 2010): breach
of information obligation.
Periscopus (EFTA Court, December 10, 2010): mandatory offer.
Seadrill Ltd. Borgarting lagmannsrett (Court of Appeal, March 9,
2009): mandatory offer, “total return swap-agreements.”
2 Stock Exchange Appeals Committee
CASE 4/2010, Global IP Solutions AB (GIPS): judgment of certain
transactions seen in connection with voluntary offer.
187 In Articles 23 and 23a of the Second Companies Directive and in the “general principles”
of the Takeover Directive, the EU legislator has referred to the interests of the company
without clarifying what is meant thereby.
188 A contribution to such a debate on a European level may be found in Sjåfjell, Towards a
Sustainable European Company Law. See also information about the research project
“Sustainable Companies” (2010–2013), including publications, at www.jus.uio.no/ifp
/english/research/projects/sustainable-companies/.
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CASE 4/2009, DNO International ASA ruling issued on September 17,
2009 on an appeal by DNO International ASA against a decision of
June 17, 2009 by Oslo Børs ASA to impose violation charges for breaches
of respectively section 5–2, first paragraph, of the Securities Trading Act
on the duty to publicly disclose information and of the provisions of
section 24, seventh paragraph, of the Stock Exchange Act on the duty to
provide information to a regulated market.
3 Supreme Court judgment
Rt. 1932.951: judgment regarding “corporate opportunity.”
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